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INTRODUCTION

HIS Article surveys significant developments in intellectual property (IP) law in the past year. We focus on case law that is precedential in the Fifth Circuit or likely to be influential in the
evolution of Texas IP jurisprudence. Thus, the cases cited focus on the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeal for
the Fifth and Federal Circuits. For developments in trademark and copyright law, the Fifth Circuit's authority is binding, but other circuits, such
as the Second and Ninth Circuit, are considered highly persuasive. Because all cases concerning a substantive issue of patent law are appealed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, decisions from the
Federal Circuit during the Survey period are also included in this Article.
While the Supreme Court considered fewer IP issues in 2008 than it did
in the previous two years, the federal judiciary overall remained very active in IP. Patent jurisprudence continued to evolve: the Supreme Court
continued to narrow the scope of patent protection, this time using the
doctrine of patent exhaustion, and the Federal Circuit further narrowed
the scope of what qualifies for patent protection. Trademark and Copyright jurisprudence also continued to adapt to the realities of the digital
age, in which electronic commerce and content sharing have created a
new IP paradigm. Because of technological and commercial pressures,
the importance of IP to our society is ever increasing. Parties continue to
vigorously litigate valuable IP rights, and courts continue to scrutinize
and shape our IP jurisprudence.
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PATENT UPDATE

THE SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS

In its only patent decision of the Survey period, Quanta Computer,Inc.
v. LG Electronics,Inc.,' the Supreme Court clarified the patent exhaustion doctrine. The case centered around two contracts between two technology giants, LG Electronics (LGE) and Intel Corporation. Under the
license contract, Intel had the right to incorporate patented LGE technology into Intel's microprocessor and chipset products but did not have the
right to grant its customers a license to combine the technology with
other than LGE or Intel products. Under a separate contract, Intel was
required to notify its customers of the limits of the license, but failure to
do so would not affect or be grounds for revoking the license. Intel and
LGE explicitly agreed that the license did not limit patent exhaustion.
Various Intel customers, including Quanta Computers, purchased Intel
products and combined them with non-Intel products in ways that utilized LGE's patented technology. LGE sued Intel's customers for patent
infringement. 2 Although both the district court and the Federal Circuit
determined that Quanta was liable to LGE, the Supreme Court reversed
on the grounds that the patent was exhausted by Intel's licensed/author3
ized sale of the product.
Under the "patent exhaustion" doctrine, an unrestricted, authorized
sale of a patented item exhausts the patentee's exclusionary rights in the
item. 4 This doctrine also covers the sale of items that do not entirely embody the patented technology if the "only and intended use" of the item
5
practices the patent.
The Supreme Court held that the doctrine applied to LGE's method
claims because Intel's sales were authorized and unrestricted, Intel's
products substantially embodied the patents, and the doctrine applied to
method patents. 6 Although the Intel license explicitly denied a license to
Intel's customers, the license did not restrict Intel's right to sell the products. 7 Further, the Court held that the products substantially embodied
the patents regardless of whether the products practiced more than the
asserted patents or required the addition of other technology, such as
bus-connected memory chips, to practice the patents. 8 Because the steps
necessary to enable the products to practice the patents were common
and non-inventive, the products substantially embodied the patents. 9
In holding that Intel's customers were protected by the patent exhaustion doctrine, the Court discarded doctrinal limits imposed by the Federal
1. 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
2. Id. at 2114.
3. Id. at 2114-15, 2122.
4. Id. at 2115.

5. Id. at 2117.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

2117-18, 2120-22.
2121.
2120.
2120-21.
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Circuit. Under Federal Circuit precedent, "the sale of a device does not
exhaust a patentee's rights in its method claims."' 1 Here, the Court noted
that "[t]o the contrary, this Court has repeatedly held that method patents were exhausted by the sale of an item that embodied the method."' "I
In the unanimous decision, Justice Thomas opined that excluding method
patents from the ambit of the patent exhaustion doctrine would "seriously undermine" the doctrine-patentees could easily avoid the doctrine
12
by simply drafting method claims to cover an apparatus.
While LGE was unable to recover under the patent laws in this instance, the Court left open the possibility of a remedy under contract law
and the ability to avoid patent exhaustion by using more restrictive licenses. 13 To hold Quanta free from infringement liability, the Court construed the Intel license only to the extent that it determined Intel's
unrestricted right to sell the microprocessors and chipsets. 14 Whether
LGE had a breach-of-contract claim was independent of patent laws, and
since LGE did not assert such a claim, the Court did not address the
issue. 15 Importantly, in finding that Intel's sales were authorized by the
license, the Court implicitly recognized that a more restrictive license
might avoid patent exhaustion.
B.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS

1. Transforming the Scope of Patentability-Inre Bilski
In what may have been the most anticipated patent decision of the Survey period, the Federal Circuit's In re Bilski centered on defining what
constitutes patentable subject matter. 16 The case revolved around Bernard Bilski's attempt to patent a process for hedging in commodity trading. The patent examiner rejected all the claims of Bilski's application as
unpatentable subject matter, and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed. In Bilski's appeal to the Federal Circuit, the en banc
court restricted its test for patentable subject matter
and affirmed that the
17
hedging method was not eligible for a patent.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is eligible for a patent only if it is a
"new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 18 The Supreme Court
has further defined patentable subject matter to exclude natural phenom10. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing
Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1341 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999)), rev'd,
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
11. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2117.
12. Id. at 2117-18.
13. Id. at 2122 n.7.
14. Id. at 2121-22.
15. Id. at 2122 n.7.
16. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). For more information on
Bilski and the issue of patentable subject matter, see David L. McCombs, et al., Intellectual
Property Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 907, 919-22 (2008).
17. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949-50.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).

2009]

Intellectual Property Law

1295

ena, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts-i.e., fundamental principles. 19 To distinguish a patentable process that is a particular
application of a fundamental principle from an unpatentable process that
fully encompasses the principle, the Supreme Court formulated the machine-or-transformation test: a process is patentable if it (1) "is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus" or (2) "transforms a particular article
into a different state or thing. ' 2° This use of a machine or transformation
of an article "must impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope" and
'2 1
must be more than mere "insignificant extra-solution activity."
In affirming the Board decision, the Federal Circuit retreated from its
well-established refinement of the machine-or-transformation test-that
a patentable process is one that produces a "useful, concrete, and tangible
result."' 22 The Bilski majority noted that while the State Street test may
"provide useful indications" of whether a process is patentable, it is not a
sufficient test in itself.2 3 The proper test is the machine-or-transformation
24
test.
Bilski's invention, admittedly not tied to a particular machine or apparatus, failed the transformation branch of the machine-or-transformation
test. 25 To satisfy the test, the "transformation must be central to the purpose of the claimed process."' 26 What "articles" may be transformed include physical objects or substances and data representing such objects or
substances, but not arbitrary data in the abstract. 27 Whether the hedging
process produces useful, concrete, and tangible results or requires physical acts is irrelevant to the patentability analysis. 2 8 Bilski's hedging process failed the test because it transformed business and legal abstractions,
not physical objects or substances or data representing such objects or
substances.

29

The Federal Circuit was explicit in defining the limits of its analysis and
holding. Patent protection is not uniquely available to the "technological

19. Bilski, 545 F.3d. at 952 & n.5 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)) (other citations omitted).
20. Id. at 954 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 70; Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192).
21. Id. at 961-62 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590
(1978)).
22. Id. at 959-60. This test is commonly associated with State Street Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
23. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 962-63.
26. Id.
27. See id. (for example, a process to transform data into a graphical display is not
patentable when the data is arbitrary and abstract but is patentable when the data repre-

sents a physical object). The court also noted that an otherwise unpatentable process is not
made patentable by merely adding an insignificant data-gathering step. Id.
28. Id. at 964.
29.

Id. at 963-64.
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arts."'30 Business method inventions are not categorically excluded from
patent protection. 3 1 The machine-or-transformation test is not written in
stone: "future developments in technology and the sciences may present
difficult challenges" to the test, and "this court may in the future refine or
augment the test or how it is applied."'32 Notably, the court did not consider the machine arm of the test and refused to opine on whether a "recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular
33
machine."
2. No Ordinary Claim Construction-02 Micro International,Ltd. v.
Beyond Innovation Technology Co.
In an appeal from the Eastern District of Texas, the Federal Circuit
34
defined the extent of a trial court's obligation to construe patent claims.
02 sued Beyond Innovation (BiTEK), alleging that several of BiTEK's
products infringed 02's patents covering specific DC-to-AC inverter controllers. The parties disputed the construction of a claim limitation common to the asserted claims: "'a feedback control loop circuit ...

adapted

to generate a second signal pulse for controlling ... [the] switches only if
said feedback signal is above a predetermined threshold."' 35 Specifically,
the parties disputed whether "only if" meant that the feedback circuit
released control over the inverter output whenever the feedback signal
fell below the threshold or only when the signal fell below the threshold
during the steady-state operation of the inverter. 36 The district court refused to construe "only if" in its claim-construction order, noting that it
had a "well-understood definition" that the jury could apply.37 In vacating the verdict, the Federal Circuit held that the court, not the jury,
38
should have construed the term.
The Federal Circuit held that the court, not the jury, must construe all
claim limitations in dispute, regardless of whether the words of the limitation have a well-understood meaning. 39 In so holding, the court distin30. Id. at 960 & n.21 (refusing to adopt the "technological arts test" under which patent protection is available only for inventions that "'involve[ ] the application of science or
mathematics"' (quoting Appellee's Br. at 24-28)).

31. Id. at 960.
32. Id. at 956.
33. Id. at 962. Although the court did not consider patentability of software, it did rely
on Benson for the machine-or-transformation test. Id. at 955. In Benson, a computer implementation of an algorithm was deemed unpatentable because tying the algorithm to the
computer did not limit the claim-the algorithm had no utility except operating on a computer and therefore was not patentable. Id. at 955 & n.9 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72).
34. 02 Micro Int'l, Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
35. Id. at 1356 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,259,615 col. 10 line 67-col. 11 line 5) (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 1356-57.
37. 02 Micro Int'l, 521 F.3d at 1361 (quoting 02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation
Tech. Co., No. 2:04-CV-32, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2005)).
38. Id. at 1361-63.
39. Id. at 1361.
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guished between the meaning of the words and the scope of the claim. 40
Ruling that a claim term has its "ordinary meaning" or that it "needs no
construction" may not satisfy the court's obligation under Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc. 41 A claim term may have more than one "ordinary meaning," and even if the parties agree that the term has an ordinary meaning, they may still dispute the scope of the claim. 42 In short,
"[w]hen the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of
'43
a claim term, it is the court's duty to resolve it."
As a procedural sidebar to the main holding of the case, the Federal
Circuit determined that BiTEK did not waive its right to appeal when it
failed to object that the jury instruction lacked a construction of the "only
if" limitation. 44 Construction of the claims was fully litigated at the
Markman hearing-BiTEK's position was clearly presented to the court,
and the court "did not clearly indicate that it was open to changing its
claim construction," thus, BiTEK did not need to reassert its position by
45
objecting to the jury instructions.
3.

Designing a New Test for Infringement-Egyptian Goddess, Inc, v.
Swisa, Inc.

In another appeal from a federal court in Texas, an en banc Federal
Circuit redefined the test for infringement of a design patent. 46 Egyptian
Goddess asserted its design patent in an infringement action against
Swisa. 47 Applying the Federal Circuit's "points of novelty" test, the district court granted Swisa a summary judgment of noninfringement. 48 The
Federal Circuit twice affirmed the district court: first, a panel affirmed the
"points of novelty" holding; then, the en banc court recanted its "points
of novelty" test but affirmed the noninfringement holding after refining
49
and applying the Supreme Court's "ordinary observer" test.
The long-standing test for infringement of a design patent stems back
to the nineteenth-century Supreme Court decision, Gorham Co. v.
White. 50 Under this test, later dubbed the "ordinary observer" test, a design patent is infringed if the designs are so similar that an ordinary observer would purchase the accused design believing it to be the patented
design. 5 1 Federal Circuit jurisprudence evolved to include a necessary
40. Id.

41. Id. at 1360-61 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd 617 U.S. 370 (1996)).

42. Id. at 1361.
43. Id. at 1362.
44. Id. at 1359.
45. Id.
46. Egyptian Goddess, Inc, v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). For
further discussion of the Federal Circuit's redesign of the test for infringement of a design
patent, see McCombs, supra note 16, at 922-24.
47. Egyptian Goddess, Inc., 543 F.3d at 668.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 668.
Id. at 669, 678, 682.
81 U.S. § 5111 (1871).
Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 670 (citing Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528).
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second test for design patent infringement-the "point of novelty" test.
Under the "point of novelty" test an accused design does not infringe
'52
unless it "appropriate[s] the point of novelty of the claimed design."
Thus, to infringe, an accused design had
to satisfy both the "ordinary ob53
server" and "point of novelty" tests.
The en banc Federal Circuit rejected its "point of novelty" test and
refined the "ordinary observer" test.54 Contrary to Swisa's argument, the
Federal Circuit explained that the Supreme Court did not adopt the
"point of novelty" test in Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co. 55 Rather, Whitman and its progeny stand for the principle that Gorham's ordinary ob56
server views the accused and patented designs in light of the prior art.
Designs that are not obviously dissimilar to the ordinary observer may
become so after the accused and patented designs are compared to the
57
prior art.
Under this refined "ordinary observer" test the observer can compare
the accused and patented design with the prior art as well as with each
other; however, the test is still one of infringement. The "ordinary observer" test is not a test of validity-the burden of production of the relevant prior art falls to the accused infringer. 58 Proof of infringement
remains the patentee's burden, regardless of whether the accused infringer raises particular prior art. 59 Pointedly, the court "[left] it to future
'60
cases to further develop the application of this standard.
4.

Immune to MedImmune-Cat Tech LLC v. Tubemaster, Inc.
In yet another appeal from a district court in Texas, the Federal Circuit
reevaluated its test for justiciability of a declaratory judgment action in a
patent dispute. 61 TubeMaster had designed four configurations of a device used for loading catalyst into multi-tube chemical reactors-one configuration had been constructed and used while the other three existed
only as mechanical drawings. Cat Tech sued TubeMaster, alleging that
TubeMaster's devices infringed Cat Tech's patent covering a method for
loading catalyst into a chemical reactor. TubeMaster counterclaimed,
seeking a declaratory judgment that its devices did not infringe the asserted patent. The district court granted the declaratory judgment of noninfringement for the three drawing-only devices. 62 On appeal, the Federal
52. Id. at 670-71 (citing Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)).
53. Id. at 671.
54. Id. at 678.
55. Id. at 672-74 (citing Whitman, 148 U.S. 674 (1893).
56. Id. 674-76.
57. Id. at 678.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 679.
60. Id. (citation omitted).
61. Cat Tech LLC. v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For more background on the justiciability of declaratory judgment actions in patent disputes, see McCombs, supra note 16, at 909-13.
62. Cat Tech, 528 F.3d at 875-78.
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Circuit affirmed that the declaratory judgment claim was justiciable, ap63
plying the second prong of its pre-Medlmmune test.
To be justiciable, a dispute must satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution. 64 Prior to MedImmune
Inc.,65 the Federal Circuit required that two criteria be met before an
action seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement satisfied the
case-or-controversy requirement. 6 6 First, the patentee must have acted in
such a way as to cause the declaratory judgment plaintiff to have a reasonable apprehension of an infringement suit.6 7 Second, the plaintiff
must have meaningfully prepared to conduct potentially infringing activity.68 In MedImmune, the Supreme Court rejected the first prong of the
test and stated that whether a declaratory judgment action is justiciable is
69
based on all the circumstances.
Although MedImmune defined a more lenient standard than the Federal Circuit's test, the "meaningful preparation" prong of the test survived.7 0 The prong "remains an important element in the totality of
circumstances"-absent the plaintiff's "significant, concrete steps to conduct infringing activity," the dispute is neither immediate nor real, and
71
the action is therefore not justiciable.
Under Cat Tech, a declaratory judgment action is justiciable when a
potentially infringing product that exists only as a design is ready for production in the normal course of business and without any significant design changes. TubeMaster's dispute was justiciable because it had
72
meaningfully prepared to potentially infringe the Cat Tech patent. It
could produce loading devices based on any of the three drawing-only
designs upon order and within a normal delivery schedule; thus, the dispute was immediate.' 3 Further, the loading devices could be produced
without any significant design changes; thus, the dispute was real.7 4 That
TubeMaster had not advertised, or even prepared to advertise, was relevant in the totality of the circumstances, but such preparation was "not an
indispensable prerequisite" to justiciability. 75
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 879-80 & n.2, 883.
Id. at 879.
MedImmune Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
Id.
Id. (citing Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1058

(Fed. Cir. 1995)); Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004), abrogated by MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118).
68. Cat Tech, 528 F.3d at 879 (citing Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc.,
846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
69. Id. (citing MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 125-37).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 880-84.
(citing Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
at 881-83.
at 882.
at 882-83.
at 883.

1300

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

5. Injunction: Go or Whoa?-Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc.
The Federal Circuit reiterated that patent disputes are not special with
respect to injunctive relief, this time with respect to grant of a preliminary
injunction.7 6 In an infringement action involving patents for an extendedrelease oral antibiotic, Sandoz claimed it did not infringe and challenged
the validity and enforceability of the asserted patents. 77 Applying the
traditional four-factor test for a preliminary injunction, the district court
granted Abbott Labs a preliminary injunction on its infringement claim
78
against Sandoz.
Pre-Sandoz Federal Circuit authority suggested that a preliminary injunction is not appropriate if the defendant raised a substantial question
of infringement, enforceability, or validity.79 The traditional test for a
preliminary injunction is based on four factors: "(1) likelihood of success
on the merits of the underlying litigation, (2) whether irreparable harm is
likely if the injunction is not granted, (3) the balance of hardships as between the litigants, and (4) factors of the public interest. '80 Under significant Federal Circuit authority, the patentee fails to establish the requisite
likelihood of success on the merits if the defendant raises a substantial
question of infringement, enforceability, or validity. 8 ' A substantial ques82
tion is one "that the patentee cannot prove 'lacks substantial merit."'
With respect to an invalidity defense, a substantial question is established
with less than the clear and convincing evidence necessary to establish
83
invalidity.
In affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit panel majority cited
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,84 and disavowed any suggestion that
patent cases warrant unique treatment with respect to preliminary injunctions. 85 "The correct standard is not whether a substantial question has
been raised, but whether the patentee is likely to succeed on the merits,
upon application of the standards of proof that will prevail at trial."'86 To
hold that a defendant may defeat a preliminary injunction by raising a
"'substantial question' that may render the patent 'vulnerable"' would
conflict with Supreme Court precedent and with the precedent of every
76. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
77. Id. at 1343-44.
78. Id. at 1344.
79. Id. at 1371-72 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (citing Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/
S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
80. Id. at 1344 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 1372 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
MacDermid Printing Solutions, L.L.C., 525 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
82. Id. at 1371-72 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (citing Amazon.com, Inc., 239 F.3d at 135051 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Genentech, Inc., 108 F.3d at 1364).
83. Id. at 1372 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc.,
452 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
84. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
85. Abbott Labs, 544 F.3d at 1365.
86. Id. at 1364.
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regional circuit. 87
6.

Two Bites at the Invalidity Apple-In re Swanson

In an appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(BPAI), the Federal Circuit clarified what constitutes a substantial new
88
question of patentability for the purposes of a patent reexamination.
The issue in Swanson centered on the validity of several claims in U.S.
Patent No. 5,073,484 in light of a prior art patent, U.S. Patent No.
4,094,647 to Deutsch (Deutsch). 89 Deutsch was overcome in the initial
examination, in an invalidity challenge in a district court, and in the appeal from the invalidity challenge. 90 In a subsequent ex parte reexamination, however, the PTO examiner rejected the claims as anticipated by or
obvious in light of Deutsch.9 1 The Federal Circuit held that the previous
considerations of Deutsch did not bar it being the basis of a substantial
92
new question of patentability and affirmed the PTO's rejection.
Under the Patent Act, the PTO may not grant a reexamination request
'93
unless the request raises a "substantial new question of patentability.
The Federal Circuit had interpreted this prerequisite to mean that a reexamination could not be based on "prior art previously considered by the
PTO in relation to the same or broader claims. '' 94 In 2002, Congress
amended the Act to overturn the Federal Circuit's overly restrictive interpretation-prior consideration by the PTO does not exclude prior art
95
from forming the basis of a reexamination.
Previously considered prior art may raise a substantial new question of
patentability except if it was previously considered by the PTO for a substantially similar purpose; that it was previously considered in a court
proceeding is irrelevant. 96 The 2002 amendment to the Patent Act clarified that the proper inquiry in a reexamination is whether the question,
not the prior art, has previously been considered. 97 The court noted that
"PTO [re]examination procedures have distinctly different standards,
parties, purposes, and outcomes compared to civil litigation." 98 In a validity challenge in civil litigation, the challenger must "overcome the presumption of validity with clear and convincing evidence," and a failure to
prove invalidity is not a binding holding of validity. 99 On reexamination,
the examiner is "conducting a subjective examination," not challenging
87. Id. at 1368-69.
88. In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
89. Id. at 1370.
90. Id. at 1372-73 (internal citations omitted).
91. Id. at 1373.
92. Id. at 1373-74.
93. Id. at 1375 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2006)).
94. Id. (quoting In re Portola Packaging Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
95. Id. at 1375-76 (citing H.R. REP. No. 107-120, at 2 (2002); 35 U.S.C. § 303(a)).
96. Id. at 1379-80.
97. Id. at 1380.
98. Id. at 1377 (citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
99. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282; Stevenson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 701
(Fed. Cir. 1983)) (other citations omitted).
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the patent; there is no presumption of validity, and claims are found invalid by a preponderance of the evidence. 100 Thus, reexamination subsequent to an unsuccessful validity challenge in court is not a review of the
court's decision-there is no violation of the Constitution's separation of
powers. 10 1
7. Shaping PermanentInjunctions Post-eBay-Broadcom Corp. v.
Qualcomm Inc.
The Federal Circuit continued its development of post-eBay injunction
jurisprudence in a dispute involving a patentee who did not practice the
asserted patents.' 0 2 Broadcom asserted three of its cell-phone chipset pat03
ents in an infringement action against a competitor, Qualcomm.
Qualcomm's accused chipsets were found to infringe, and-although
Broadcom did not itself practice the patents-the district court granted a
permanent injunction. 10 4 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the inQualcomm's argument that
junction as to the infringed patents, rejecting
105
the injunction violates the eBay criteria.
To warrant a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must establish:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate
for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
interest would not be disserved by a permaand (4) that the 0public
6
nent injunction.
In affirming the injunction, the court refused to opine on whether, after
eBay, there is a rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury but held that
a patent owner is not barred injunctive relief for a failure to practice or a
willingness to license the patents. 10 7 Further, an infringer is not protected
from an injunction merely because he has successfully exploited the infringing technology and an injunction would harm his business.' 0 8 Finally,
an injunction can be custom-tailored to minimize the harm to the parties
and the public. 10 9
The injunction was appropriate because of the nature of the cell-phone
chipset market, the nature of Broadcom's license to a third-party user,
100. Id. (citing In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Etter, 756 F.2d at 85658).
101. Id. at 1378-79.
102. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For further discussion of the eBay-effect, see McCombs, supra note 16, at 924-25 and David L. McCombs,
et al., Intellectual Property Law, 60 SMU L. REv. 1141, 1145-47 (2007).
103. Broadcom Corp., 543 F.3d at 686-87.
104. Id. at 686.
105. Id. at 701, 704-05.
106. Id. at 702 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).
107. Id. at 702-03.
108. Id. at 704 (citing Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 05-CV-467, slip op. at 5-6
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2007); Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12
(Fed. Cir. 1986)).
109. See id.
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and the injunction's sunset provision which allowed for twenty months of
continued infringement in exchange for a court-mandated royalty. 110
That Broadcom competed with Qualcomm by producing a substitute
chipset design indicated irreparable injury and lack of adequate remedy
at law even though Broadcom did not directly compete with chipsets that
practiced the patents."' Broadcom's license to Verizon, a downstream
user, was distinguishable from a license to Qualcomm, a direct competitor, and thus did not detract from the irreparable harm or lack of adequate remedy at law.' 12 Finally, the sunset provision allowed Qualcomm
time to design around Broadcom's patents, thus reducing the harm to
Qualcomm and the inconvenience to the public that would result from an
immediate permanent injunction. 113
8. How Many Defendants Can You Fit in a Volkswagen-In re TS
Tech USA Corp.
In a case that could have substantial impact on patent litigation in the
Fifth Circuit, the Federal Circuit granted a writ of mandamus to transfer
an infringement action from the Eastern District of Texas to the Southern
District of Ohio. 114 Lear sued TS Tech in the Eastern District of Texas,
alleging that TS Tech infringed Lear's patent covering automobile headrest assemblies.1 1 5 Lear is a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in Michigan, and TS Tech is incorporated in Ohio and Canada
with principal places of business in Ohio and Ontario." 6 Roughly six
weeks after Lear filed the lawsuit, TS Tech moved to transfer venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 1 17 After the district court denied the transfer,
TS Tech petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus.1 1 8 In
granting the writ, the Federal Circuit applied Volkswagen"1 9 from the
120
Fifth Circuit.
In the Fifth Circuit, a § 1404(a) motion to transfer venue should be
granted if, considering the private and public forum non conveniens factors, the transferee venue is clearly more convenient.' 2 1 The private interest factors are: "(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the
110. Id. at 702-04.
111. Id. at 702-03.

112. Id.
113. Id. at 704. In an interesting twist on the case, the Federal Circuit held one of the
three patents invalid; thus, royalties paid pursuant to the sunset provision became another

source of contention between the parties. See Broadcom, Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 585 F.
Supp. 2d 1187, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 2008). Broadcom was ordered to refund roughly $11 million
in sunset royalties paid during the pendency of the appeal. Id. at 1188, 1192.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1317.

119. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

120. TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1319. In Volkswagen, the en banc Fifth Circuit granted a writ
of mandamus for transfer from the Eastern to the Northern District of Texas. 545 F.3d at
307. For further discussion of the Volkswagen case see McCombs, supra note 16, at 926-28.
121. TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1319 (citing Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 314-15, 314 & n.9).
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availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses;
(3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical
problems that make a trial easy, expeditious and inexpensive. ' 122 The
public interest factors are:
"(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2)
the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3)
the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case;
and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary 1problems
of conflicts of laws
23
[or in] the application of foreign law."'
The plaintiff's choice of venue is accorded deference, but it is not a distinct factor in the § 1404(a) analysis; the deference is manifest in the mov1 24
ing party's burden.
Holding that the district court's denial of the transfer motion was "a
clear abuse of discretion" and "patently erroneous," the Federal Circuit
noted "several key errors" in the district court's analysis.1 2 5 First, too
much weight was accorded the plaintiff's choice of venue when it was
considered a "factor against transfer.1' 1 26 Next, the district court did not
accord sufficient weight to the fact that the key witnesses and the vast
majority of the physical and documentary evidence in the case was all in
Ohio, Michigan, and Canada-900 miles closer to the Southern District
of Ohio than to the Eastern District of Texas. 127 Finally, too much weight
was accorded the local interest in having the localized interests decided at
home. 12 8 The only thing tying the case to the Eastern District was vehicles sold there that were also sold nationwide-"the citizens of the Eastern District of Texas have no more or less of a meaningful connection to
this case than any other venue. ' 129
9.

Waive that Patent Goodbye-Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.

One of the important patent disputes of the Survey period focused on
patentee misconduct both before and during litigation. 130 Qualcomm asserted video-compression patents against Broadcom based on
Broadcom's H.264-compliant products. H.264 is a video compression
standard established by the Joint Video Team (JVT), an industry standards setting organization (SSO). Qualcomm participated in the JVT during development of the H.264 standard without disclosing the patents.
Notably, Qualcomm denied participating in the JVT until email evidence,
the existence of which Qualcomm denied during discovery, came to light
122. Id. (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)).
123. Id. (quoting Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315).

124. Id. at 1320 (citing In re Horseshoe Entm't, 337 F.3d 429, 434-35 (5th Cir. 2003);
Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 314 n.10).
125. Id. at 1320-22.
126. Id. at 1321.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1320-21.
129. Id. at 1321 (citing Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 318).
130. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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at trial in the cross-examination of a Qualcomm witness. Broadcom
claimed that Qualcomm's failure to disclose the patents to the JVT constituted waiver of the right to assert the patents.13 1 The district court
found waiver, held the patents unenforceable against the world, awarded
Broadcom its attorney fees, and referred the case to the magistrate to
determine appropriate sanctions for Qualcomm's litigation
132
misconduct.
An IP holder may waive its IP rights by failing a duty to disclose its IP
to an SSO.133 Waiver is appropriate if the failure to disclose is "so incon-

sistent with an intent to enforce [the IP] rights as to induce a reasonable
belief that such right[s] have been relinquished."1 34 A participant in an
SSO has a duty to disclose its related IP if: (1) the policies of the SSO
unambiguously require such; or (2) the members of the SSO treated the
policies as requiring such. 135 The remedy for waiver through nondisclosure to an SSO is fashioned by the court to "give a fair, just, and equitable
1 36
response reflective of the offending conduct."'
The Federal Circuit affirmed that Qualcomm had failed its duty to disclose the patents to the JVT and that such failure constituted
Qualcomm's waiver of its IP rights.1 37 In holding the patents unenforceable against the world, however, the district court went beyond the
"broadest permissible unenforceability remedy."'1 38 The Federal Circuit
held that the proper remedy was to hold the patents unenforceable
139
against all H.264-compliant products.
In addition to the unenforceability judgment and an exceptional case
award, Qualcomm and its outside counsel were also sanctioned for litigation misconduct. 4 0 Because Qualcomm intentionally withheld twentyone known emails that directly indicated its participation in the JVT, refused to search for more relevant documents once the emails were discovered, and, in sum, failed to produce over 46,000 relevant documents, the
magistrate judge ordered sanctions against Qualcomm and its outside attorneys.' 41 Qualcomm was ordered to pay nearly $10 million of
Broadcom's legal fees, offset by those paid pursuant to the exceptional
case award. 142 Qualcomm's outside attorneys, deemed to have remained
intentionally ignorant of the relevant evidence, were named and de131. Id. at 1008-09.
132. Id. at 1009-10.
133. Id. at 1021.

134. Id. at 1020 (quoting Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-CV-1958, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28211, at *32-33 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007)).

135. Id. at 1011-12 (citing Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081,1096, 1098
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
136. Id. at 1026.
137. Id. at 1022.
138. Id. at 1026.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1010.
141. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-CV-01958, 2008 WL 66932, at *4-6, *9
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008).
142. Id. at *17.
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scribed in the sanctions order, and six were referred to the California
State Bar for investigation of ethical violations.1 4 3 Qualcomm's in-house
counsel and the sanctioned outside attorneys were ordered to participate
in the CREDO program to determine why the discovery violations occurred and to create a detailed plan to prevent such violations in the future. 144 The district court subsequently vacated the sanctions ordered
against the outside counsel, freeing them from the attorney-client145privilege so that they could defend themselves against the allegations.
III.
A.

GONE IN

1.2

COPYRIGHT

SECONDS-CARTOON NETWORK V.

CSC HOLDINGS

The influential Second Circuit determined that a cable company did
not infringe by copying content to a remote storage digital video recorder
(RS-DVR) at the request of its subscribers. 146 The RS-DVR is basically a
DVR that is owned, housed, and maintained by the cable company, CSC.
Programs transmitted to CSC are sent to the RS-DVR data buffer which
stores roughly 1.2 seconds worth of the program. Programs are written
from the data buffer to the RS-DVR hard drive, and played back from
the hard drive, at the cable subscriber's remote-control command. A variety of program providers sued CSC, alleging that its use of the RS-DVR
directly infringed copyrights covering the programs. The district court
held that CSC directly infringed by: (1) storing the program in the RSDVR data buffer; (2) copying the program to a hard drive; and (3) transmitting the recorded program to the subscriber at the subscriber's request. 147 The 8 Second Circuit reversed on all three counts of
14
infringement.
The Second Circuit first determined that the program did not reside in
the data buffer for sufficient time to qualify as a copy, and thus, CSC did
not infringe by storing the program in the buffer. 149 For the portion of the
program in the data buffer to qualify as a copy, the program must be
embodied in the buffer such that it can "be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.' 1 50 In holding that this statutory language imposes two distinct rethe work be embodied and that it be embodied for a
quirements 5 1-that
sufficient duration-the court distinguished MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak
Computer Inc.152 The MAI court held that loading software into RAM
143. Id. at *13, *16.
144. Id. at *18-19.
145. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05-CV-01958, 2008 WL 638108, at *1-2
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008).
146. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
147. Id. at 124-25.
148. Id. at 140.
149. Id. at 130.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127.
151. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127-29.
152. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
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was copying the software but did not specifically address the "transitory
duration" language of the Copyright Act. 153 Noting that "it seems fair to
assume that in [the MAI case and its progeny] the [software] was embodied in the RAM for at least several minutes," the Second Circuit construed MAI to mean that loading data into RAM may be, but is not
necessarily, copying. 154 Although the program was embodied in the data
buffer, with only a 1.2-second storage time, it was embodied for merely a
1 55
transitory duration.
Next, the Second Circuit held that CSC did not directly infringe by recording the program to the RS-DVR hard drive because it was the subscriber, and not CSC, who made the copy. 156 The Second Circuit adopted
the reasoning of Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services,157 and held direct infringement requires an "element
of volition" on the alleged infringer's part. 58 Merely supplying a system
that a third party may use to infringe does not constitute direct infringement. 159 It is the subscriber who supplies the necessary volition by pressing "the button to make the recording," not the person who
"manufactures, maintains, or... owns" the RS-DVR.160
Finally, the Second Circuit determined that the transmission of the recorded program was "to a single subscriber using a single, unique copy
produced by that subscriber" and therefore did not constitute an infringing public performance. 16' Whether a transmission is to the public, such
that it constitutes an infringing public performance, depends on who is
capable of receiving that particular transmission-not on who is capable
of receiving the underlying work that is being transmitted nor on who is
capable of receiving the original transmission of the work. 162 A court
should consider every factor that may limit the potential audience of the
transmission, including the fact that each transmission of a recorded work
is of a unique copy on the subscriber's RS-DVR. 163 Importantly, not
every commercial transmission is a public performance. 164 The playback
was a transmission of the particular copy recorded by the subscriber and
153. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 127-28.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 130. The RS-DVR data buffer is also RAM. Id. at 128 n.1.
156. Id. at 133. The court noted that the issue was direct infringement, not contributory
infringement. See id. at 124, 130.
157. 970 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
158. Id. at 130.
159. Id. at 130-31 (citing Netcom, 970 F. Supp. at 1370; CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet,
Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004)).
160. Id. at 131, 133.
161. Id. at 139.
162. Id. at 134-36.
163. Id. at 137-38 (noting that the court in Colum. Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Home,
Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984), a case cited by the plaintiffs and relied on by the district
court, "explicitly relied on the fact that [the] defendants showed the same copy of a work
seriatim to its clientele.").
164. Id. at 138-39 (rejecting the reasoning of the court in On Command Video Corp. v.
Colum. Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991)).

1308

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

165
uniquely keyed to the subscriber; it was not a public performance.

B.

DANCING UP A STORM-LENZ V. UNIVERSAL Music CORP.

The court in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. considered the obligation
to investigate infringement prior to sending a takedown notice pursuant
to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 166 Universal sent
YouTube a DMCA takedown notice after Ms. Lenz posted a video of her
children dancing to Prince's "Let's Go Crazy" on the video-sharing site.
Universal claimed that Lenz's video infringed Universal's copyright in the
song and demanded that YouTube remove the video from the site. YouTube complied, notified Ms. Lenz, and warned her that her account might
be deleted for any further copyright infringement.1 67 Ms. Lenz sued Universal for misrepresentation, alleging that Universal did not consider that
the video was non-infringing fair use and that, therefore, Universal's
takedown demand was made in bad faith under the DMCA. 168 The court
held that Ms. Lenz had made sufficient allegations to support a claim and
169
denied Universal's motion to dismiss.
Under the DMCA, a copyright owner can demand that an internet service provider remove content, the use of which the owner, in good faith,
believes is "not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the
law."17 0 If the person making the demand "knowingly materially misrepresents" that the content infringes, he is liable for damages that result
from the service provider removing the accused content in reliance on the
171
misrepresentation.
The court determined that in order for Universal to have a good faith
belief that the video infringed, it first had to consider whether the video
made fair use of the song. 172 Fair use is use "authorized by law," and
requiring a pre-notice inquiry furthers the purpose of the DMCA and
copyright law in general. 173 "Requiring [the] owners to consider fair use
will help 'ensure[ ] that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the Internet will
expand without compromising the movies, music, software and literary
works that are the fruit of American creative genius.'"174 The court
noted, however, it is unlikely that a copyright owner's consideration and
rejection of fair use "will meet the requisite standard of subjective bad
175
faith" of a misrepresentation action.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 135, 139.
572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Id. at 1151-53.
Id. at 1153, 1156.
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1153 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2006)).
17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
Id. at 1154-55.
Id. at 1156 (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998)).
Id. at 1155.
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ANY PORT IN A STORM-Io GROUP, INC. V.
VEOH NETWORKS, INC.

In another dispute involving a post to a video-sharing website, the
Northern District of California applied the DMCA safe harbor provisions
to shield the website from infringement liability. 176 The copyright owner,
Jo, sued Veoh for copyright infringement after Veoh.com users posted
Jo's copyrighted material to the site without Jo's authorization. 177 The
court held that Veoh qualified under the DMCA safe harbor and was
liable for monetary relief to Jo for the infringing posts of
therefore not 178
Veoh's users.
Under the DMCA safe harbor, an internet service provider is not liable
for monetary relief for infringement that results from user-directed storage of material on the provider's system. 179 To qualify for the safe harbor
in the Ninth Circuit, the service provider must: (1) terminate the accounts
of repeated or blatant infringers when appropriate; 80 (2) expeditiously
remove material that it knows, or should know, infringes; and (3) either
"not have the right and ability to control the infringing activity" or not
8
financially benefit because of the infringement.1 '
The court determined that the DMCA's safe harbor provisions are not
limited to "conduit only" service providers-Veoh's modifications to its
users' videos did not disqualify it for the safe harbor.' 8 2 Veoh's system
converted the user's file to the common Flash video format and extracted
183
still images and associated them with the file prior to storing the file.
Noting that the conversion and extraction was an automatic process "initiated entirely at the volition of Veoh's users," the court held that this
"means of facilitating user access to [the videos]" does not disqualify
184
Veoh from the DMCA safe harbor.
The court also held that a service provider without the ability to "limit
or filter copyrighted material" prior to its post does not have control over
its users' infringing activity. 185 Veoh did not have the ability to control the
infringing activity because: (1) its control over its system does not enable
it to control the content selected and uploaded by the user; and (2) Veoh
did not encourage users to infringe. 186 Importantly, Veoh does not have
176. See generally to Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D.

Cal. 2008).
177. Id. at 1136-37.
178. Id. at 1155.
179. Id. at 1142 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006)).
180. Id. at 1142-43 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072,
1080 (9th Cir. 2004)).
181. Id. at 1146 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)-(C)).
182. Id. at 1147.
183. Id. at 1146-48.
184. Id. at 1148 (citing Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121,
131 (2d Cir. 2008)).
185. Id. at 1151 (quoting Tur v. YouTube, Inc., No. CV-64436, 2007 WL 1893635 at *3
(C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007)).
186. Id. at 1153 (distinguishing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
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the obligation to modify its operation to gain control over the infringing
187
activity; rather, its obligation is to stop known infringing activity.
D.

WANNA BUY A WATCH? THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE-

OMEGA

S.A.

v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP.

In a dispute over copyrighted watches, the Ninth Circuit limited the
extraterritorial application of the first-sale doctrine.1 88 The watches in
question were manufactured by Omega in Switzerland, first sold outside
the U.S., then acquired by an intermediary who in turn sold them to
Costco for resale in the U.S. Omega never authorized the importation or
subsequent U.S. sales of the watches and sued Costco for copyright infringement. 189 In reversing the district court's summary judgment in favor
of Costco, the Ninth Circuit held that the statutory first-sale doctrine is
not triggered by a foreign sale of a copy made outside the U.S. 1 90
Under the first-sale doctrine, as codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), an
owner of a copy "lawfully made under [the Copyright Act]" may import
and sell that copy "without the authority of the copyright owner." 191 A
line of Ninth Circuit cases, beginning with BMG Music v. Perez,192 interpreted § 109(a) such that it was not triggered by foreign sales of foreignmade copies. The court provided two alternate justifications for its construction of § 109(a): first, the foreign-made copies are not "lawfully
made under [the Copyright Act]," and second, allowing a foreign sale to
trigger § 109(a) would render the Copyright Act's prohibition of unauthorized importation of a work "virtually meaningless. ' 193 In L'anza Research194 the Ninth Circuit applied the BMG Music's second justification
to further limit § 109(a)-the court held that § 109(a) was not triggered
by a foreign sale of a U.S.-made copy. The Supreme Court reversed
L'anza Research and rejected the Ninth Circuit's construction of
195
§ 109(a).
In holding that the foreign sales of the Omega watches did not trigger
§ 109(a), the Ninth Circuit determined that the "lawfully made" argument of its § 109(a) jurisprudence survived Quality King. The court first
noted that Quality King did not resolve whether § 109(a) was triggered by
a foreign sale of a foreign-made copy. 196 Next, the court noted that the
187. Id. at 1154.
188. See generally Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008).

189. Id. at 983-84.
190. Id. at 990.

191. Id. at 984-85 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006)) (citing Quality King Distribs., Inc.
v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 144-45 (1998)).
192. 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991).
193. Id. at 985. BMG Music in turn relied upon CBS v. Scorpio Music Distribs., 569 F.
Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd without opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984). Omega S.A.,
541 F.3d at 986.
194. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th
Cir. 1996).
195. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 148, 154.
196. Omega, 541 F.3d at 987 (citing Quality King, 523 U.S. at 154 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).

1311

Intellectual Property Law

2009]

basis of the "lawfully made" argument-the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law-is not "clearly irreconcilable" with
Quality King's "brief discussion on extraterritoriality. '' 197 The Ninth Circuit reiterated that the Copyright Act "presumptively does not apply to
conduct that occurs abroad," held that its pre-Quality King "lawfully
Costco
made" jurisprudence survived Quality King, and further held that 198
could not use § 109(a) to overcome Omega's infringement claim.
E.

A GNU

INFRINGEMENT-JACOBSEN

V. KATZER

In a dispute involving copyright claims to open-source software, the
Federal Circuit determined that a violation of the open-source software
license was copyright infringement.1 99 Jacobsen claimed that Katzer violated Jacobsen's copyright by using his code without adhering to the Artistic License, an open-source license, under which Jacobsen shared the
code. 200 Denying Jacobsen's motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court determined that because of the unlimited scope of the Artistic
License, violating the license was not copyright infringement.2 01 The Federal Circuit held that Jacobsen had a copyright20 2claim and vacated the district court's denial of preliminary injunction.
The Federal Circuit determined that the Artistic License was limited in
scope, and that violation of its terms constitutes copyright infringement.2 0 3 Violation of a nonexclusive license constitutes copyright infringement only if the license is of limited scope. 20 4 Although the Artistic
License does not restrict the extents to which a user can "copy, modify,
and distribute the software" it only grants this right provided that the
user prominently documents the changes and meets one of several use
conditions. 20 5 Noting that these conditions "were both clear and necessary to accomplish the objectives of the open source licensing collaboraof limited scope and thus,
tion," the court held that the license20 was
6
infringement.
was
license
the
violating
The court also noted the importance of injunctive relief for infringing
use of code shared pursuant to an open-source license.20 7 Although the
197. Id.
198. Id. at 988-90.
199. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Originally, the dispute was over
the validity of Katzer's patents relating to the code but evolved to include the copyright
claim. See id. at 1377; Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. 06-CV-01905 JSW, Complaint (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 13, 2006).
200. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1376-77.
201. Id. at 1375-76 (citing Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. 06-CV-01905 JSW, 2007 WL 2358628,
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007)).
202. Id. at 1382-83.
203. Id. at 1381-83.
204. Id. at 1380 (citing Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1121
(9th Cir. 1999); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989)) (other
citations omitted).
205. Id. at 1380.
206. Id. at 1381-82.
207. Id.
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code was shared for something other than monetary consideration, it was
entitled to the same legal recognition as any copyrighted material. 20 8
Without the ability to enforce the license through injunctive relief, the
open source license conditions may be rendered meaningless. 20 9 Although it recognized the importance of injunctive relief, the court also
noted that whether there is a presumption of irreparable harm stemming
from copyright infringement may need to be "reevaluated in light of eBay
Inc."210

IV. TRADEMARK
A.

IF You CAN'T SEE IT, AM

I USING IT? METATAGs-NORTH

AMERICAN MEDICAL CORP. V. AXIOM WORLDWIDE, INC.

The Eleventh Circuit joined the debate over whether use of a trademark as a metatag in a website constitutes "use in commerce" under the
Lanham Act. 2 11 Axiom used two of North American Medical's (NAM)
trademarks as metatags in Axiom's website code. These tags were included to influence internet search engines to return Axiom's site in response to searches on its competitor's trademarks. While Axiom's
website never displayed the trademarks, the search result description of
Axiom's site included the marks and highlighted them. Although the appellate court vacated the district court's decision enjoining Axiom from
using the marks as metatags, it affirmed the district court findings that the
212
metatags constituted use in commerce.
In analyzing likelihood of success on a trademark infringement claim,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the use of metatags to influence a search
engine in a marketing effort is "use in commerce in connection with the
advertising of any goods" under the Lanham Act's trademark infringement provisions. 213 Explicitly rejecting the Second Circuit's reasoning as
espoused in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.,21 4 the court held

that whether the mark was displayed to the consumer is irrelevant to
2 15
whether the mark was used in commerce.
Although it held that NAM was likely to succeed in an infringement
action, the court vacated the injunction, holding that the Supreme Court's
208. Id. at 1382.
209. Id.
210. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1378
(quoting MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1212 (C.D. Cal.
2007)). For a similar pronouncement on the effect of eBay on copyright, see Warner Brothers Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
211. See generally N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211 (11th
Cir. 2008). For more discussion on the issue of metatag use in commerce, see McCombs,
supra note 16, at 931-33.
212. Id. at 1216-17, 1229.
213. Id. at 1218-19.
214. 414 F.3d 400, 408-10 (2d Cir. 2005) (not a "use in commerce" when not displayed
to the consumer).
215. N. Am. Med., 522 F.3d at 1219-20.
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eBay decision applied to injunctive relief in trademark infringement. 216
Because the parties and the district court had not addressed the issue, the
court refused to decide whether the Eleventh Circuit's rule that irreparable harm is presumed217from the likelihood of success on an infringement
claim survived eBay.
B.

No

OBLIGATION TO "BACK THE BLUE"-TFFANY

INC.

v. EBA Y, INC.

In a potentially seminal decision, the Southern District of New York
defined the extent of an online marketplace's liability for the infringing
acts of its users. 2 18 Tiffany sought to hold eBay liable for the sale of counterfeit Tiffany jewelry by eBay users on eBay's website. Among other
claims, Tiffany claimed that eBay was liable for direct infringement for
use of TIFFANY in eBay advertising and for contributory infringement
for allowing the users' sales. The court held that eBay's use of TIFFANY
was nominative fair use and that it did not have an obligation to preempwas not liable for either
tively remove listings of Tiffany jewelry-eBay
2 19
direct or contributory infringement.
The court determined that eBay "exercises sufficient control and monitoring over its website" such that it could be liable for its users' infringement. 220 Under Supreme Court precedent, a manufacturer or distributor
is liable for contributory trademark infringement if it "continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know" is infringing.22 1 The court held that this Inwood test is not limited to product
suppliers and extends to service providers that have sufficient control
over the infringer's "means of infringement. '2 22 While eBay does not
have the ability to control or inspect the items sold by its users, it "actively facilitates" sales by providing the software and hardware of the
electronic marketplace. 223 It also promoted sales by independently advertising the Tiffany jewelry and by "actively working" with sellers to improve sales. 224 Further, eBay profits from the sales, excludes certain items
225 EBay is subject to Inwood.226
from the market, and suspends users.
EBay's generalized knowledge of infringement was insufficient for liability under Inwood. The court determined that Inwood requires more
than generalized knowledge because extending liability where there is
some uncertainty would unacceptably expand trademark rights and po216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 1228-29.
Id.
See generally Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 502 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982)).
Id. at 504-06 (quoting Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d

980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999)).

223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 506.
Id.
Id. at 506-07.
Id. at 507.
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tentially stifle legitimate sales. 22 7 Although Tiffany asserted in demand
letters that "counterfeiting was rampant" on eBay, that Tiffany did not
authorize third-party sales, and that any seller offering five or more Tiffany items should be presumed to be infringing, it did not identify any
specific instances of infringement-"eBay was under no obligation to
credit the potentially self-serving assertions of a trademark owner. '2 28
Further, that Tiffany purchased some counterfeit "Tiffany" items on eBay
was enough to determine that there was some infringement, however, it
"was insufficient to require eBay to ban" all Tiffany sales, and eBay removed the specific listings so identified by Tiffany as counterfeit. 22 9
EBay had no obligation to "ferret out potential infringer[s]" based on
general knowledge of infringement or mere allegations.2 30 Nor did eBay
have an obligation to immediately suspend an identified infringer; removing the listing was sufficient.2 31 Finally, even if it was easier for eBay to
find and filter infringers, it was Tiffany's obligation to police its mark, not
23 2
eBay's.
C.

THE GOODS AND NOTHING BUT THE GOODs-HERBACEUTICALS,
INC. V. XEL HERBACEUTICALS, INC.

In a cancellation proceeding, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB) determined that the remedy for fraudulent misstatements of use
in the procurement of a trademark registration is complete cancellation
of the mark. 233 Xel Herbaceuticals (Xel) filed sworn statements of use
connected with its applications to register several marks. 234 In these statements, Xel identified a number of goods that were not associated with the
mark. 235 Because these misstatements of trademark use rose to the level
of fraud, the TTAB canceled the marks, not just with respect to the fraud236
ulently claimed uses, but in their entirety.
The TTAB rejected Xel's arguments for partial cancellation.2 37 Such a
cancellation "would merely place Xel in the same position" as if it had
complied with the law in its initial filings. 238 The nature of the claimed
227. Id. at 510.
228. Id. at 511-12. The court noted that even with Tiffany's tightly controlled distribution of its products, a legitimate secondary market for Tiffany jewelry may exist. Id. at 47274, 474 n.9.
229. Id. at 485-86, 512-13.
230. Id. at 513-15.
231. Id. at 517.
232. Id. at 518.
233. See generally Herbaceuticals, Inc. v. Xel Herbaceuticals, Inc., 86 USPQ2d 1572
(TTAB 2008).
234. Id. at 1574, 1577.
235. Id. at 1577.
236. Id. at 1578. In another case involving an allegation of fraudulent identification of
goods associated with the mark, the -TAB held that a pre-registration amendment to correct the identification creates a rebuttable presumption that the applicant "lacked the willful intent to deceive the [Patent and Trademark] Office." Univ. Games Corp. v. 20Q.net
Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1465, 1468 (TrAB 2008).
237.

Herbaceuticals,Inc., 86 USPQ2d at 1577.

238. Id.
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goods was neither complicated nor highly technical-"the mark was either in use on all [the] goods, or it was not. '2 39 The statement of use
could not be divided into sworn and unsworn portions; the "declaration
relates to all statements in the document of which the declaration is a
part. '240 Finally, the fact that Xel's attorney signed the statement without
actual knowledge of the use did not protect Xel; the attorney was obliged
24 1
to inquire as to the actual use.
D.

ORDINARILY MULTILINGUAL-IN RE SPIRITS

INTERNATIONAL

N.V.

In denying registration of an English transliteration of a Russian word
as a trademark for vodka, the TTAB reiterated that the ordinary American purchaser is multilingual. 242 Spirits International applied to register
MOSKOVSKAYA for vodka. 243 "Moskovskaya" is the English transliteration of the Russian adjectival form of "Moscow," meaning "of or from
Moscow. '244 The TTAB affirmed the PTO's refusal to register the mark
because MOSKOVSKAYA was primarily geographically deceptively
245
misdescriptive under the doctrine of foreign equivalents.
Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, a foreign term from a modern common language is translated into English to determine whether it
is descriptive if the "ordinary American purchaser" would translate the
term. 246 In affirming the PTO examiner's refusal, the TTAB held that the
"ordinary American purchaser" is one who is "knowledgeable in the[]
foreign language," the Federal Circuit's Palm Bay Imports notwithstanding. 247 The TTAB held that Palm Bay Imports did not state that the ordinary American purchaser lacks of knowledge of a foreign language, but
rather that the purchaser in that case was unlikely to translate the
term. 248 Here, the TTAB held that the ordinary American purchaser was
knowledgeable in Russian, would translate MOSKOVSKAYA into English, and that therefore the mark was primarily geographically decep249
tively misdescriptive for vodka that was not from Moscow.
V.

CONCLUSION

As technology and commerce continue to evolve and probe the limits
of our jurisprudence, both the substance and procedure of intellectual
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1577-78 (citing Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx, Inc., 67 USPQ2d 1205, 1209
(TTAB 2005)).

241. Id.

242. See generally In re Spirits Int'l N.V., 86 USPQ2d 1078 (TTAB 2008).
243. Id. at 1079.
244. Id. at 1081 (quoting THE OXFORD RUSSIAN-ENGLISH DICFIONARY (1972)).
245. Id. at 1080, 1090.
246. Id. at 1081-82 (citing Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
247. Id. at 1082.
248. Id. at 1083.

249. Id. at 1080, 1090.
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property law are subject to increased scrutiny and tension. Look for patent reform to continue in 2009, with a likely focus on patent damages. As
in the past few years, the push for reform will be apparent both in our
nation's judiciary and legislature. With the Eastern District of Texas's role
as the patent "rocket docket" in question, other districts are likely to encounter an increased number of patent disputes. Nationwide, courts will
be confronted with issues as diverse as constructing the proper remedy
for patent infringement, determining when the use of an automated filesharing system exposes the system provider to liability, and defining to
what extent a provider of a virtual market must police activity within the
market. Intellectual property jurisprudence will continue to evolve and
adapt as courts face new issues that arise in our constantly changing
society.

